Brand or Variety Choices and Periodic Sales as Substitute Instruments for Monopoly Price Discrimination by Tian Xia & Richard J. Sexton
Rev Ind Organ (2010) 36:333–349
DOI 10.1007/s11151-010-9249-5
Brand or Variety Choices and Periodic Sales
as Substitute Instruments for Monopoly Price
Discrimination
Tian Xia · Richard J. Sexton
Published online: 14 May 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract We study the puzzle that sellers often employ diverse strategies in terms
of carrying multiple brands and holding periodic sales. These two selling tools can be
substitute instruments to induce consumer self selection and implement price discrim-
ination. We analyze the factors that affect a seller’s choice between the two pricing
instruments and show how different combinations of the two instruments can be opti-
mal under alternative market conditions. A seller may, surprisingly, increase her total
number of offers when it becomes more costly to carry brands or hold sales if there
are decreasing marginal costs of the alternative selling tool.
Keywords Brands · Multiple varieties · Price discrimination · Sales · Self selection
1 Introduction
Carrying multiple brands, varieties, or models in a product category and holding peri-
odic sales for some of them are two common marketing strategies for sellers with
market power. In the presence of consumers with heterogeneous demands for the
product either strategy can be used to induce consumer self-selection and implement
second-degree price discrimination (Tirole 1988; Salant 1989). Sellers often employ
diverse strategies in terms of using these two tools. For example, some retailers use
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extensive sales and specials, often called “high-low pricing”, while others maintain
stable prices with few or no sales, often called “everyday low pricing” (Lal and Rao
1997).
Why do sellers adopt such widely divergent strategies? We argue that contempo-
raneous price discrimination through offering multiple varieties or brands at differ-
entiated prices and intertemporal price discrimination through holding periodic sales
of a particular brand/variety are substitute marketing strategies for a seller to induce
consumer self selection and implement second-degree price discrimination. Given the
same discounted price, consumers are indifferent between consuming a lower-quality
brand/variety now and consuming a higher-quality brand/variety later, as long as the
two alternatives provide the same present value of utility.
This substitutability allows a seller to use different combinations of carrying
brands/varieties and holding sales to induce consumer self selection, with the specific
optimal choice determined by the relative costs of offering multiple brands versus
holding sales and various characteristics of the seller’s products and customers. We
develop a model to explore this intuition. We derive the seller’s optimal total number
of offers (each defined as a product price and quality level, and the time when that
price-quality pair is available) and the distribution of those offers between number
of brands/varieties provided at regular prices and number of promotions from putting
some of those brands/varieties on sale at a later time.
Analysis of the equilibrium provides insight into the factors that affect a seller’s
choice between contemporaneous and intertemporal price discrimination and helps
explain sellers’ diverse marketing strategies by showing how different combinations
of the two marketing instruments can be optimal under alternative market conditions.
A no-sales strategy is likely for products with a narrow quality range, relatively homo-
geneous consumers, and high sales costs relative to brand/variety carrying costs. A
wider quality range and greater consumer heterogeneity cause a seller to provide
more offers and be more likely to use both multiple brands/varieties and periodic
sales. Interestingly, a seller may increase its number of offers when either carrying
brands/varieties or holding sales becomes more costly if there is decreasing marginal
cost of the alternative selling tool.
We discuss the relevant literature in Sect. 2 of the paper and then set forth the model
in Sect. 3. Section 4 develops the model’s equilibrium and derives comparative static
results, while Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Quality and Intertemportal Price Discrimination
Prior studies have mostly focused on contemporaneous or intertemporal price dis-
crimination in isolation with little consideration given to the choice of instrument(s)
to use. Mussa and Rosen (1978) showed that a monopolist can provide different
varieties of a basic product to implement second-degree price discrimination among
consumers who put heterogeneous valuations on different varieties of the good.1 Con-
sumers whose preferences for the product are most intense can be induced to purchase
1 P’ng and Lehman (2007) call this marketing strategy “indirect segment discrimination”.
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high-quality and high-price versions of the product, while consumers with milder pref-
erences choose lower quality, cheaper versions. A monopolist can, thus, select a menu
of quality-price pairs to maximize profits subject to the constraints that the consumers
are willing to purchase the brand/variety targeted to them (individual rationality) and
are not tempted to purchase a brand/variety targeted to a different consumer segment
(self selection).
Maskin and Riley (1984) extended this work to the case when consumers’ prefer-
ences are different over both quality and quantity of a good, while Gabszewicz et al.
(1986) studied a monopolist’s optimal range in terms of product quality and found that
the monopolist either provides the maximum number of varieties possible or offers
only one variety, depending on how much tastes differ among consumers. Donnenfeld
and White (1988) further analyzed the scenario where consumers are heterogeneous
in both absolute and marginal willingness to pay for quality and showed that a monop-
olist may distort or restrict the quality range of product at either the low end or the
high end.
Even if consumers discount future consumption at the same rate, the forgone utility
from deferring consumption is greater for consumers with the highest intensity of pref-
erence because their potential utility from consumption is greatest. These consumers
may be persuaded to purchase the product at a high initial price, while those with
milder preferences wait to purchase it on sale. Thus, intertemporal price variations for
a product may also be a device to induce consumer self selection and implement price
discrimination.
The literature on intertemporal price strategies and sales has focused on the condi-
tions when intertemporal price variations can be a tool for self selection and second-
degree price discrimination. Such discrimination is not possible if a seller is unable
to commit to a dynamic price strategy. Because rational consumers anticipate the
monopolist’s incentive to engage in successive price reductions over time to capture
the patronage of lower-valuation consumers, no one is willing to buy at prices above
marginal cost. This basic intuition, due to Coase (1972), was confirmed in formal mod-
els under varying conditions by Stokey (1981), Gul et al. (1986), and Sobel (1991).
However, many other studies have examined commitment devices that enable a
seller to avoid this outcome. Tirole (1988) and Waldman (2003) provide summaries
of this literature. Examples include fixed capacity (Bulow 1982), increasing marginal
cost (Kahn 1986), reputation formation (Ausubel and Deneckere 1989), and contrac-
tual provisions such as most-favored-customer and best-price clauses (Butz 1990).
More recently Deneckere and Liang (2008) showed that finite durability of the good
(planned obsolescence) prevents emergence of Coase’s equilibrium.
Even with commitment power, intertemporal price discrimination is not necessarily
optimal for a monopolist. Stokey (1979) assumed that a monopolist had commitment
power over a finite horizon and faced a continuum of consumers distinguished by
differing reservation prices. She showed that price discrimination did not emerge in
the standard case—all sales take place when the product is first introduced.
Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1984), however, showed that sellers hold periodic
sales to conduct intertemporal price discrimination when some customers have high
valuations and are impatient relative to others, and new consumers enter the market in
each period. The entry of new customers provides a commitment device because it is
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rational for the monopolist to sell to only high-value entrants until enough low-value
customers have accumulated to warrant holding a sale.
Landsberger and Meilijson (1985) showed that intertemporal price discrimination
is optimal for a seller with commitment who has a lower discount rate than do consum-
ers, and Van Cayseele (1991) found that intertemporal price discrimination is more
profitable for a monopoly seller than is a single-price strategy when the seller has
commitment power and high-valuation consumers run the risk of being rationed if
they defer consumption in hope of obtaining a lower price.
Few studies have examined brand/variety choices and dynamic price strategies
jointly, and none has established the inherent substitutability between quality/variety
and intertemporal instruments of price discrimination that we demonstrate here. Salant
(1989) showed that the price-quality choice problem of Mussa and Rosen (1978), the
intertemporal pricing problem of Stokey (1979), and the price-quantity choice prob-
lem of Spence (1977) could all be cast in a single, unified framework that illuminates
the conditions when self selection and second-degree discrimination are profitable
for a monopolist, but he gave no consideration to the choice of which instrument to
use.
Bagnoli et al. (1995) showed that a monopolist may achieve higher profits by offer-
ing a sequence of quality-price menus of multiple varieties over time than can be
obtained from a single menu. Kühn (1998) considered a durable-good monopolist,
who sells a high-quality and low-quality version (subject to failure) of a product,
which he calls, respectively, a “durable” and “nondurable” good. He showed that
the monopolist is able to conduct intertemporal price discrimination in this setting
because the possibility of selling the nondurable provides a commitment device for
the seller who when selling the durable good must be compensated for the forgone
opportunity to sell the nondurable version of the good. Kumar (2002) examined a
model with customer resales where a monopolist could vary both price and quality
over an infinite horizon. However, only one quality can be offered at a given time in
his model.
3 The Model
Inducing consumer self selection enables the seller to segment consumers based upon
differences in intensity of preference or willingness to pay for the seller’s product.
As noted, both contemporary price discrimination through carrying multiple brands
or varieties and intertemporal price discrimination through holding periodic sales can
induce consumer self selection.
However, inducing self selection comes at a cost. First, the availability of offers
targeted to consumers with lower valuations for the product limits the seller’s ability
to extract surplus from consumers with high valuation because they may choose an
offer targeted for low-valuation consumers. Second, to relax this self-selection con-
straint for high-valuation consumers, the seller has an incentive to distort the quality of
offers targeted to low-valuation consumers, thereby creating a deadweight loss. Salant
(1989) derives general conditions under which inducing self selection is optimal for a
seller in the presence of these considerations.
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Another cost of inducing self selection, although one largely ignored in the liter-
ature, is the cost associated with making multiple offers of the basic product. There
will normally be additional costs associated with offering multiple brands or varieties
instead of just one and also costs associated with holding periodic sales. Depending
upon the circumstances of a seller, these brand/variety carrying costs and sales costs
may differ considerably and affect the seller’s decision as to how many offers to make
and their distribution between brands/varieties and periodic sales.
We extend the Gabszewicz et al. (1986) model to provide a framework that permits
the joint analysis of contemporaneous and intertemporal price discrimination. Given
our interest in studying contemporaneous and intertemporal price discrimination in
those settings when it is optimal for a seller to induce self selection, we make a for-
mal assumption on the range of consumer heterogeneity or “income” relative to the
product quality range to insure that self selection is induced in equilibrium.
3.1 The Seller
We consider a monopoly that can sell multiple varieties, brands, or models of a product
line to consumers and also put some of them on sale. The seller could be a retailer
who chooses among brands of a product offered by competitive manufacturers, sets
prices for the brands, and makes decisions on whether to hold sales for some of the
brands.
The model also applies to a monopoly manufacturer who produces and sells multiple
varieties or models of a product line to consumers through competitive retailers. The
manufacturer could be a monopolist per se or a seller of a highly differentiated product
line with strong brand identity so that the customer base is primarily those who have
committed ex ante to purchase a product in the manufacturer’s line. To simplify the
analysis, we ignore any interactions between demand for this product line and demand
for any other goods sold by the firm.
The seller faces heterogeneous consumers who are in the market to purchase at most
one unit of the product over a finite horizon specified as [0, T]. The seller chooses a
marketing strategy at the outset of the horizon in terms of price, quality, and timing of
offers for the product line to maximize profits over the horizon. Planning over such a
finite horizon is consistent with actual business practices and is known in the market-
ing literature as the “trade promotion calendar” (Silva-Risso et al. 1999; Besanko et
al. 2005).2
Consistent with recent contributions such as Koh (2006) and Board (2008) and
observed behavior (Waldman 2003; Zhang and Krishnamurthi 2004), we assume that
the seller is able to commit to this strategy. Our results, thus, establish a benchmark
for the outcomes that a seller can achieve when it can commit (Board 2008).
2 In the case of manufacturer-set promotions, retailers generally are provided with the trade promotion
prices, distribution of promotions across brands, and dates in advance (Hall et al. 2003; Besanko et al.
2005). Manufacturers normally do not deviate from the trade promotion policies stated in the calendar
(Zhang and Krishnamurthi 2004).
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The number of vertically differentiated brands or varieties of the product that are
available is exogenous and denoted by J.3 (Although the context need not be brands per
se, for parsimony of presentation we henceforth refer to the J products as “brands”.)
The qualities that consumers uniformly associate with these brands are u1, u2, . . ., uJ,
where 0 < u = u1 < u2 < · · · < uJ = u.
These qualities may be objective or “perceived” in the sense that they exist in con-
sumers’ minds due to the effects of brands and advertising. The seller’s problem is
to choose the total number of offers, N, to make and the distribution of those offers
between M ∈ [1, J] “regular” offers from carrying M brands and charging a regular
(nonsale) price for them,4 and H = N − M promotional offers created by lowering
the (discounted) prices of some of the M brands at some later period(s) during the
time horizon. These H promotional offers may include multiple discounts at different
points in time for a given brand.
We consider the model framework to apply to a rather broad range of semi-durable
goods that feature multiple brands, varieties, or models, are purchased periodically by
consumers, and are unlikely to be inventoried by them. For example, a car, appliance,
or consumer electronics manufacturer (or retailer) knows that a set of consumers are in
the market possibly to purchase a product from its line over a given horizon, and each
will accept the offer that maximizes his utility or not purchase at all if no satisfactory
offer is forthcoming.
In addition, the model may also offer insights regarding retailing of some nondur-
able consumer goods or services that are nonstorable and subject to periodic purchases.
For example, shoppers may adopt the rule of serving an expensive food item like steak
periodically, if a suitable deal is presented. A retailer can induce self selection by
offering multiple grades and cuts and/or by offering periodic sales of some items.
Each seller offer thus consists of the price (P) and quality level (u) of the product,
and time (t) when the price-quality pair is available. Regular offers (subscript r) are




, m = 1, 2, . . ., M. Because consumers are
assumed to be impatient, anyone who accepts a regular offer will do so at the outset
of the horizon, so tr,m = 0. The H promotional offers (subscript h) that arise from





n = M + 1, M + 2, . . ., N. By definition, consumers must wait some time for a brand
to go on sale, so 0 < th,n ≤ T.
We assume that unit variable procurement cost is the same for all quality levels, and
for simplicity set those costs equal to zero. This assumption is common in studies of
vertical differentiation as a way to simplify the analysis.5 In our model this assumption
3 In the context of a retailer, J is the total brands available from competitive manufacturers. In the case of
a manufacturer, J is the total number of varieties or models that are feasible to produce and market in the
short run, e.g., due to technological constraints.
4 This seller decision can reflect a manufacturer’s choice of M brands to produce among J brands that
are technologically feasible, or the decision to offer M among J extant brands in a particular market. For
example, auto manufacturers usually carry different models and different numbers of models in Europe
relative to the US.
5 A partial listing of prior authors who have utilized this assumption includes Shaked and Sutton
(1982), Gabszewicz et al. (1986), Bolton and Bonanno (1988), Bental and Spiegel (1995), Bonnisseau
and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006), and Jing (2007).
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enables a recursive approach to be utilized to solve the model and obtain analytical
solutions. As we discuss subsequently, the paper’s core results continue to hold when
the unit variable procurement cost is increasing in the quality level.
The seller incurs a carrying cost, B(M, b), for stocking M brands of the product and
a sales cost, S(H, s), for holding H sales, where b > 0 (s > 0) is a cost-shift parameter for
carrying brands (holding sales). The marginal cost of carrying brands and holding sales
is B1(M, b) = ∂B(M, b)/∂M and S1(H, s) = ∂S(H, s)/∂H, respectively.6 Each mar-
ginal cost function is increasing in its cost-shift parameter: ∂B1/∂b > 0, ∂S1/∂s > 0.
We assume that B1 (S1) is monotonically changing in the number of brands (sales)
and define B11 = ∂2B(M, b)/∂M2 and S11 = ∂2S(H, b)/∂H2. The total cost of pro-
viding M regular offers and H = N − M promotional offers is thus TC(N, M) =
B(M, b) + S(N − M, s).
3.2 Consumer Behavior
Specification of consumers’ utility follows Gabszewicz et al. (1986). A given mass of
consumers is in the market to buy a version of the product during the marketing hori-
zon, but they are heterogeneous in terms of their willingness and/or ability to purchase
it. We denote this consumer heterogeneity by θ, which can be interpreted as the income
that a consumer has available to spend over the horizon (Shaked and Sutton 1982). We
assume that θ is distributed uniformly in the range [θ0, λ θ0], with θ0 > 0, λ > 1, and
density function f(θ) = 1/(λ θ0 − θ0), where λ measures the degree of heterogeneity
among consumers, and θ0 indicates the “base” income level of consumers.
Consumers are assumed to be forward looking and can anticipate all N offers that
will be made during the entire time horizon.7 Each consumer purchases either one unit
of the good or none during the horizon. A consumer will accept the offer that yields
the highest utility, if this utility is higher than his reservation utility,U(θ) = θ u0,
where 0 < u0 < u; otherwise he will not buy at all. By accepting an offer, (P, u, t), a
consumer with income θ pays the price P and obtains one unit of product with qual-
ity u at time t. His discounted utility is defined as U(θ, P,u,t) = (θ−Pe−γ t) u δ(t) =(
θ−Pe−γ t) ue−ρt , where γ > 0 is the interest rate, and δ(t) = e−ρt is the quality
discount factor, ρ > 0. The lowest value of δ(t) is δ(T) = e−ρT = δ˜ ∈ (0, 1).
Consumers with higher θ are willing to pay more to purchase the product than are
their lower-income counterparts. The quality discount factor indicates that all con-
sumers prefer consuming earlier than later, but the intensity of time preference is an
increasing function of θ. We define a new variable, v = u δ(t), to represent the dis-
counted value of the quality of an offer, which we call the “present quality”. We also
6 For example, a retailer’s brand carrying costs would include the transactions costs of dealing with multiple
brand manufacturers and stocking multiple brands. Retailers’ sales costs would include the array of activi-
ties collectively known as “menu costs”, and possible promotional costs due to notifying consumers of the
sale price.
7 This assumption is also standard in the literature on durable-goods monopoly (e.g., Conlisk et al. 1984;
Sobel 1991; Kühn 1998) and is supported broadly by research on consumer behavior [see especially Krishna
(1989) and the survey by Chintagunta et al. (2006)].
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discount the prices of all offers to the current price level at the beginning of the time
horizon (t = 0) by defining p = Pe−γ t .
The introduction of the new variables v and p transforms an offer from a price-
quality-time bundle, (P, u, t), to a discounted price and present quality bundle, (p, v).
We order the N present qualities, vr,1, vr,2, . . . , vr,M, vh,M+1, vh,M+2, . . . , vh,N, and
re-label them as vk, k = 1, 2, . . . , N, where v1 < v2 < · · · < vN. Correspondingly, we
re-label the N regular and promotional offers as (p1, v1), (p2, v2), . . . , (pN, vN). The
seller thus provides N discounted price-present quality bundles, (p, v), to consumers
through her choices of M regular offers and N − M promotional offers. Accordingly,
a consumer’s utility from accepting an offer (pk, vk) can be restated as:8









Consumers only care about the present quality of an offer regardless of whether it
comes from a regular offer or a promotional offer. Given the same discounted price, a
consumer is indifferent between consuming a low-quality brand in the current period
and a high-quality brand at a later period, if each provides the same present quality, v.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
Define a feasible quality range of the product as [u0, u] such that (i) consumers are
willing to pay a nonnegative price to consume a product with any quality in this range,
and (ii) all qualities of the range can be produced using current technology. The present
qualities of the M regular offers must be chosen from the quality set of the available
brands. That is, ur,m = vεr,m{u1, u2, . . . , uJ}, where m = 1, 2, …, M. We assume that
there are a sufficiently large number of available brands J and that their qualities are
relatively evenly distributed over the quality range [u0, u] to enable this condition to
hold and, also, ensure that carrying some or all brands plus putting some or all brands
on sale can provide all product (present) quality values in the range [u0, u].9
The seller chooses a marketing strategy to maximize her discounted profit, which is
equal to her discounted revenue minus her total selling costs. We denote the income of
consumers who are indifferent between accepting two adjacent offers, (pk−1, vk−1)
and (pk, vk), as θk = (pkvk − pk−1vk−1)/(vk − vk−1) with k ≥ 2. Similarly, the
income of consumers who are indifferent between accepting (p1, v1) and not buying
8 A literal interpretation of our version of the Gabszewicz et al. utility function is that a consumer has θ units
of income available at the outset of the horizon. If a consumer purchases the product, he immediately spends
θ−p units on the numeraire commodity and saves p units at interest rate γ in anticipation of purchasing the
product for price P in period t.
9 This assumption works well when the seller is a manufacturer, who can choose varieties or models with
qualities along a continuum. That means the quality set of the available varieties for the manufacturer is
the quality range, [u0u], so the qualities of the M regular offers can always be chosen from the quality set
of the available brands and carrying the M brands plus putting some or all of them on sale can provide
all product quality values in the range [u0, u]. When the seller is a retailer who chooses brands from the
available manufacturers’ brands, store-owned (private-label) brands can represent a device for retailers to
fill in any “missing” brands that are needed to provide the M regular offers. We consider implications of
relaxing this assumption in Appendix 2 of our working paper (Xia and Sexton 2007).
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the product at all is θ1 = p1v1/(v1 − u0). We assume that this type of consumer
exists, which requires that θ0 < θ1 at the equilibrium. In turn this inequality implies
a condition on the distribution of consumer income, λ, relative to the width of the
quality range, u/u0:
λ > N∗ + 1 − (N∗ − 1)/ (u/u0)1/N∗ ,
where N∗ is the value of N at the equilibrium as defined in Eq. (11) below, and it is a
function of the model’s parameters, θ0, λ, u0, u, b, s, and δ˜.
Consumers with θ ∈ [θ0, θ1) do not buy any product; consumers with θ ∈ [θk, θk+1)
with 1 ≤ k < N accept the offer (pk, vk); and consumers with θ ∈ [θN, λ θ0] accept
the offer (pN, vN). Thus, the discounted revenue function is









where, θ1 = p1v1/(v1 − u0) and θk = (pkvk − pk−1vk−1)/(vk − vk−1) for k =
2, 3, . . . , N.
The profit function is
π(N, p, v, M) = R(N, p, v) − TC(N,M) = R(N, p, v) − [B(M, b) + S(N − M, s)].
Note that the only variable to appear in both the revenue and the selling-cost functions
is N. The variables pk and vk are in the revenue function only, and the variable M is in
the cost function only. Thus, the seller decides the optimal marketing strategy in two
stages: In the first stage, based on consumers’ rational expectations about the values
of pk, vk, and M, the seller chooses the optimal number of offers to maximize her
profit. In the second stage, given N, the seller (i) sets the discounted prices, pk, and
present qualities, vk, of the offers to maximize discounted revenue, and (ii) chooses
the optimal number of brands, M, and sales, H = N −M, to minimize the total selling
cost of providing N offers. The model is solved using backward induction.
4.1 Revenue Maximization with Given N
In the second stage, the seller’s revenue-maximization problem given N offers is


























for k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
From the first-order conditions (FOCs) for p1 through pN, we obtain
(p2 − p1) [(v2 + v1)/(v2 − v1)] = p1[(v1 + u0)/(v1 − u0)], (1)
(pk+1 − pk)
[
(vk+1 + vk)/(vk+1 − vk)
]
















)] = λθ0 − pN. (3)
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> 0 (R(·) is
increasing in the value of the highest present quality), the optimal choice of vN is u, the highest
available quality (Gabszewicz et al. 1986). From the FOCs for v1 through vN−1, we obtain
(v1 − u0)2 v2
/[
















= (pk − pk−1
)2 /(pk+1 − pk
)2 for k = 2, . . . , N − 1. (5)
Solving Eqs. (1) through (5) and using the condition that v∗N = u, we find the optimal choices
of discounted prices and present qualities as follows:






(N + 1) (u/u0)1/N − N + 1
]
for k = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where u/u0 measures the width of the quality range, and (u/u0)1/N = v∗k+1/v∗k > 1 measures
the difference at the optimum between every two adjacent present qualities, v∗k and v∗k+1. Substi-
tuting the optimal prices and present qualities into the revenue function yields the maximum
discounted revenue function, given N total offers, as
R∗(N
∣












4.2 Cost Minimization with Given N
The seller chooses the distribution of N total offers between number of brands carried, M, and
number of sales conducted, H = N − M, to minimize total selling cost in the second stage, sub-
ject to the constraint that enough brands are carried to provide N total offers. When consumers
are patient (δ˜ is large) and/or the product quality range is wide (a large u/u0), carrying only
one brand (the brand with highest quality u) plus putting it on sale may not enable the seller
to provide the offers with some lowest optimal present qualities, i.e. uδ˜ > v∗1. In that case, the
seller needs to carry additional brands with quality levels lower than u to be able to provide all N
optimal offers. Specifically, the seller can provide at most β (N) = 1 + log(1/(u/u0)1/N
) δ˜ ≥ 1
offers by carrying one brand and putting it on sale. Thus, the minimum number of brands that
must be carried to provide all N optimal offers is M (N) = N/β (N), where 1 ≤ M (N) ≤ N.10
To see this result, note first that carrying one brand with vk plus putting it on sale can pro-




. Because the ratio between the
highest and the lowest quality in this range, vk/
(
vk δ˜





where (u/u0)1/N is the quality ratio between two adjacent optimal offers, there are at most
(β(N) − 1) + 1 = β(N) optimal present qualities in the range [vk δ˜, vk
]
. Thus, carrying one
brand plus putting it on sale can provide at most β (N) optimal offers.
10 In discussing numbers of brands/varieties and sales, we limit our attention throughout to integer values.
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The range of present 
qualities of β  optimal 
offers that can be 
provided by carrying 
brand RM with quality 
( )N M 1v
∗
− − β and putting it 
on sale 1β −  times. 
1v
∗
( )N M 1v
∗




−β ( )N 1v
∗
− β− Nv u
∗
=
The range of the 
present qualities of β
optimal offers that can 
be provided by carrying 
brand R2 with quality 
Nv
∗
−β and putting it on 
sale 1β −  times. 
The range of present 
qualities of  β  optimal 
offers that can be 
provided by carrying 
brand R1 with quality 
Nv u
∗
=  and putting it 
on sale 1β −  times. 
v, 
present quality
Fig. 1 The general linear product quality space
For example, the seller must carry the brand with the highest quality, v∗N = u. Denote this
brand as R1. Carrying R1 plus putting it on sale enables the seller to provide offers with the




, where v∗N−β < v
∗





includes the β (N) optimal present qualities: v∗N, v∗N−1, …, v∗N−(β−1). Figure 1
illustrates the general linear product quality space, v, and the range of offers attainable from
carrying a brand/quality and offering it on sale.
The formal cost minimization problem is
Min{M} TC(M |N) = B (M, b) + S (N − M, s) (7)
s.t.(i) M ≤ N,
(ii) M ≥ M (N) .
Define Mˆ (b,s,N) as the unconstrained solution to the cost-minimization problem.11 The optimal





Mˆ (b,s,N) if M (N) ≤ Mˆ ≤ N (Case 1)
N if Mˆ > N (Case 2)
M (N) if Mˆ < M (N) (Case 3).
(8)
The solutions for M in (8) are substituted back into the objective function to obtain the











N − Mˆ, s
)
if M (N) ≤ Mˆ ≤ N (Case 1)
B (N, b) if Mˆ > N (Case 2)
B
(
M (N) , b
) + S (N − M (N) , s) if Mˆ < M (N) (Case 3).
(9)






N − Mˆ, s
)
> 0,
and it is assumed to hold. Thus the marginal cost of at least one selling tool is increasing and, if there is
decreasing marginal cost for using the other tool, the increasing rate of the marginal cost of the first tool
is greater than the decreasing rate of the second tool. When the second order condition does not hold, a
monopolist will always choose only one selling tool.
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Case 1 occurs when neither constraint to problem (7) binds. The optimal number of brands
is M∗ = Mˆ (b,s,N), and the optimal number of sales is N − Mˆ. The number of brands in this
case is determined by the seller’s relative cost between carrying brands and holding sales and
the total number of offers. We obtain ∂Mˆ/∂b < 0 and ∂Mˆ/∂s > 0, so the optimal number of
brands in the unconstrained case is decreasing in the brand-carrying cost factor and increasing
in the sales cost factor.
For given values of market and cost parameters, there are in general multiple choices for
the seller (combinations of price, quality, and time) in the unconstrained case to provide the
N − Mˆ optimal promotional offers in terms of which of the Mˆ brands are offered on sale and
the number of sales for a given brand. For example, the choices may range from putting one
brand (e.g., the brand with the highest quality, u) on sale for N − Mˆ times, to choosing N − Mˆ
different brands and putting each of them on sale once if N − Mˆ ≤ Mˆ ⇔ N ≤ 2Mˆ.
These choices are equivalent for the seller because cost and profit are the same with any
one of the choices—i.e., as long as the seller is able to provide the same present qualities of
the N − Mˆ optimal promotional offers, it doesn’t matter whether it is an earlier sales offer of a
low-quality brand or a later sales offer of a high-quality brand.
Case 2 occurs when the constraint, M ≤ N, is binding. In this case, the seller provides
all N offers through carrying brands and holds no sales. Case 3 applies when the constraint,
M ≥ M (N), binds. Here the unconstrained optimal number of brands is smaller than the mini-
mum number of brands that are required for the seller to provide all N offers. Thus, the seller’s
optimal strategy is to carry the required minimum number of brands and hold N − M (N)
sales—the “minimum-brands-plus-sales” case.
4.3 The Profit-Maximizing Choice of Total Offers, N
Turning now to the first stage, the seller chooses the number of total offers to maximize profit,
given the discounted revenue and selling-cost functions:
Max{N} π (N) = R
∗(N) − TC∗(N). (10)
Assuming an interior solution (i.e., N∗ ≥ 1), the FOC to (10) is ∂R∗/∂N − ∂TC∗/∂N = 0,
where from (6) and (9),
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B1 (N, b) if Mˆ > N (Case 2)
B1
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if Mˆ < M (N) (Case 3).
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Table 1 The effects of variables/parameters on total number of offers, N
Parameter/variable Case 1 (unconstrained) Case 2 (no-sales) Case 3 (minimum-
brands-plus-sales)
b − if S11 > 0 − −
0 if S11 = 0
+ if S11 < 0
s − if B11 > 0 0 −
0 if B11 = 0
+ if B11 < 0
u/u0 + + ?
θ0 + + +
λ + + +
δ˜ 0 0 ?
The symbols, +, −, 0, and ? denote positive, negative, no, and indeterminate effect, respectively
In each of the three cases N∗ is the solution of an implicit equation relating N to the model’s
parameters, θ0, λ, u/u0, b, s, and δ˜. Denote the optimal numbers of offers for the three cases as
N∗1, N∗2, and N∗3, respectively. For case 1 (unconstrained), N∗1 is the solution of the equation,
0 = F1 (N) def= MR(N
∣





For case 2 (no sales), N∗2 is the solution of the equation,
0 = F2 (N) def= MR(N
∣
∣θ0, λ, u/u0 ) − B1 (N, b) .
For case 3 (minimum brands plus sales), N∗3is the solution of the equation,
0 = F3 (N) def= MR(N
∣
∣θ0, λ, u/u0 ) − B1
(
M (N) , b
)
/β (N)2 − S1
(
















) ≤ Mˆ (b,s,N∗1
















4.4 Discussion of the Equilibrium
Comparative static analysis can be conducted using (11) and the implicit function theorem to
determine how the model parameters affect N∗ and the optimal combination of carrying brands
and holding sales. The comparative static results for N∗ are summarized in Table 1, and the
formal derivations are provided in our working paper (Xia and Sexton 2007). Here we discuss
the intuition behind some of the more important and interesting results.
The marginal revenue curve, MR(N
∣∣θ0, λ, u/u0 ), from adding offers is downward sloping.
Thus, depending upon the values of the model parameters, MR(·)may intersect one of the three
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cases of the marginal cost curve, and this intersection yields the optimal number of total offers.
Three parameters shift marginal revenue: λ, the extent of consumer heterogeneity; θ0, the base
level of consumer income; and u/u0, the feasible range of the quality space. Increases in each
of these parameters increase marginal revenue for all three cases, in general increasing the
equilibrium number of offers for each case. These results, because they affect the revenue side
of the problem, would also generally be robust to alternative specifications of cost, such as an
increasing cost of quality.12
The marginal cost curve, MC(N |·) = ∂TC∗/∂N, of adding offers depends upon which, if
any, constraint of the cost-minimization problem is binding. For unconstrained case 1, the opti-
mal distribution of N between brands and sales depends on the cost factors of both carrying
brands and holding sales. Given a value of N, an increase in the cost factor of one tool of
providing offers causes the seller to reduce the number of offers provided through this tool and
to increase the use of the alternative tool to provide offers. Thus, for example, the effect of an
increase in b, the cost of carrying brands, on MC(N |·) depends on how the marginal cost of
holding sales changes with the number of sales. An increase in b shifts MC(N |·) down (up) if
the marginal cost of holding sales is decreasing (increasing). The similar result applies for an
increase in s.
Thus, an increase in either b or s may not cause a seller to reduce the total number of offers for
the unconstrained case. A seller provides more offers when the cost of using one tool increases
if there is decreasing marginal cost for using the alternative tool to provide offers.13 Figure 2
illustrates this result. The equilibrium in panel (a) is represented by N∗ total offers, M∗brands,
and H∗ = N∗ − M∗sales. Panel (b) depicts an increase in b, which results in fewer brands,




, the latter result due to the decrease in the




caused by the decreasing marginal cost
of holding sales.
We do not see this behavior in the constrained cases 2 and 3 because the constraints on
the number of brands or offers in those cases restrict a seller from switching between carrying
brands and holding sales in response to changes in one or both cost factors. Thus, an increase in
b increases MC(N |·) and results in fewer offers for cases 2 and 3, and an increase in s increases
MC(N |·) and is associated with fewer offers for case 3.14
Another interesting result is that a seller may switch from using only one type of instrument
(multiple brands or periodic sales of a single brand) to using both instruments to induce con-
sumer self selection if the range of the quality space becomes wider, consumers become more
heterogeneous, and/or the consumers’ income increases. An increase in one or more of these
factors, u/u0, λ, and θ0, increases marginal revenue, making it profitable to provide additional
12 Some caveats apply as to the effect of u/u0. First, the effect on the equilibrium number of offers is
indeterminate for the minimum-brands-plus-sales case because both MR and MC shift in that case, with
the MC shift due to the possible need to carry more brands to cover a wider quality range. In a model with
increasing procurement cost of product quality, if the procurement cost increases rapidly in the quality level,
the seller may choose not to provide the offer with the highest quality. In this case, the width of the quality
range would have no effect on the total number of offers.
13 Even if the cost factors of both tools increase jointly, a seller may still provide more offers if the effect
of the decreasing marginal cost of using one tool is strong enough to offset the effect of the increasing
marginal cost of using the other tool.
14 The directions of the effects of the brand-carrying and sales-holding cost parameters should remain
the same, although the magnitudes of the effects may change, in the presence of an increasing quality cost
because the seller also considers the different procurement costs when choosing the total number of offers
and the optimal combination of selling instruments.
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Fig. 2 The effect of the cost factor of carrying brands when there is decreasing marginal cost of holding
sales. a The benchmark case, b The case when b increases to b+1
offers, which, in turn, may cause the seller to use the other instrument of price discrimination
that previously was too costly to use.15
5 Conclusions
We have presented a model to study a monopolist’s optimal choices in terms of carrying qual-
ity-differentiated brands or varieties and holding periodic sales. Given the same discounted
15 Lal and Rao (1997) established a duopoly equilibrium between retailers in which one retailer adopts a
NS strategy and the other adopts a high-low pricing strategy. Our model shows that the emergence of NS
and high-low retailers need not be due to competitive market positioning among them but instead can be
due to the factors noted in this discussion. Our expanded working paper (Xia and Sexton 2007) provides
numerical examples to illustrate these points.
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price, consumers are indifferent between consuming a low-quality brand now and consuming a
high-quality brand later, as long as the two alternatives provide the same present value of utility.
Thus, contemporaneous price discrimination through carrying various brands and intertem-
poral price discrimination through holding sales are substitute marketing strategies for a seller
to induce self selection among consumers and generate revenue from them. This substitutabil-
ity allows a seller to use different combinations of carrying brands and holding sales, with the
specific optimal choice determined by various characteristics of the seller’s store(s), products,
and customers. Prior research, however, has mostly studied either tool in isolation.
Our analysis helps in understanding why different sellers of a particular product often use
divergent selling strategies, and why some product categories are used frequently for sales,
while others seldom, if ever, go on sale. A no-sales marketing strategy is more likely to emerge
for products with a narrower quality range, relative homogeneity among potential consumers,
and high sales costs relative to brand carrying costs. Conversely, product lines featured on sale
will be those with more heterogeneous consumers, a wider quality range, and relatively low
sales costs.
We also showed how various factors affect a seller’s strategy in terms of the optimal number
of offers, and the seller’s choice between using only one type of instrument and using both types
of instruments to conduct price discrimination. A seller may increase the total number of offers
when it becomes more costly to carry brands or hold sales if there are decreasing marginal costs
for the alternative selling tool. A wider product quality range, greater heterogeneity among
consumers, and higher values of income of consumers all cause a seller to provide more offers
and to be more likely to use both multiple brands or varieties and periodic sales to induce self
selection.
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